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Managers generally have discretion in determining how components of earnings are presented in financial 
statements in distinguishing between ‘normal’ earnings and items classified as unusual, special, 
significant, exceptional or abnormal. Prior research has found that such intra-period classificatory choice 
is used as a form of earnings management. Prior to 2001, Australian accounting standards mandated that 
unusually large items of revenue and expense be classified as ‘abnormal items’ for financial reporting, but 
this classification was removed from accounting standards from 2001. This move by the regulators was 
partly in response to concerns that the abnormal classification was being used opportunistically to manage 
reported pre-abnormal earnings. This study extends the earnings management literature by examining the 
reporting of abnormal items for evidence of intra-period classificatory earnings management in the unique 
Australian setting.  
Design/methodology/approach  
This study investigates associations between reporting of abnormal items and incentives in the form of 
analyst following and the earnings benchmarks of analysts’ forecasts, earnings levels, and earnings 
changes, for a sample of Australian top-500 firms for the seven-year period from 1994 to 2000. 
Findings  
The findings suggest there are systematic differences between firms reporting abnormal items and those 
with no abnormal items. Results show evidence that, on average, firms shifted expense items from pre-
abnormal earnings to bottom line net income through reclassification as abnormal losses.   
Originality/value  
These findings suggest that the standard setters were justified in removing the ‘abnormal’ classification 
from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed that all firms acted opportunistically in the 
classification of items as abnormal. With the removal of the standardised classification of items outside 
normal operations as ‘abnormal’, firms lost the opportunity to use such disclosures as a signalling device, 
with the consequential effect of limiting the scope of effectively communicating information about the 
nature of items presented in financial reports. 
 
Key Words:  Earnings management; Abnormal items; Special items; Financial reporting; Accounting 
standards   
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1. Introduction  
Generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) allow management to use discretion 
in determining how certain items are classified, or where they are reported in the 
financial statements, referred to in the literature as ‘classificatory choice’. Classification 
affects where an item is placed in the financial statements and hence can result in more 
detailed disclosure of an item by means of its placement. For example, if management 
wishes to distinguish the transitory nature of a transaction from ‘normal earnings’, 
classifying an item as unusual, special, significant, exceptional, abnormal or 
extraordinary may achieve this objective.  
There is also the view that ‘classificatory choice is a powerful earnings management 
instrument’ (Beattie, Brown, Ewers, John, Manson, Thomas & Turner, 1994: 807). 
Classificatory choice is a form of intra-period earnings management, hence there is no 
effect on bottom-line earnings and, therefore, it is less likely to attract scrutiny from 
auditors; as it does not affect inter-period earnings, there is no effect on future earnings. 
Moreover, it is within GAAP and there are no tax consequences (Athanasakou, Strong 
& Walker, 2007). 
The Australian regulatory environment prior to 2001 provides a unique setting to 
examine intra-period classificatory choice using unusual items. Prior to 2001, the 
Australian accounting standard AASB 1018: Profit and Loss Accounts1 required 
companies to classify unusually large items of revenue and expense as ‘abnormal items’ 
to distinguish such items from ‘normal’ earnings. The ambiguity of AASB 1018 
allowed Australian firms flexibility in deciding whether to classify an item as an 
ordinary item or as an abnormal item. Abnormal items are akin to special items reported 
in the U.S. and exceptional items reported in the U.K. 
Unlike other jurisdictions, AASB 1018 permitted firms to present a separate line item in 
the income statement to show a sub-total for ‘operating income before abnormal items’. 
Figure 1 provides an illustrative example of how the line items were typically presented 
in a firm’s financial statements. As Figure 1 shows, Australian firms reported a sub-total 
for ‘operating profit before abnormal items’ followed by the line item for earnings 
classified as ‘abnormal items’ after which a total for net operating profit (loss) after 
abnormal items before income tax was presented. The line item that financial analysts 
                                                 
1 Unless stated otherwise, references to accounting standards pertain to accounting standards as they applied during 
the study period.  
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focused on and which Australian firms highlighted when reporting on measures of 
financial performance was the sub-total of ‘profit before abnormal items’. 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
In contrast, the U.S. accounting standard APB 30 Reporting the Results of Operations 
specifically prohibits presentation of income before special items in the financial 
statements. Thus, for U.S. firms the transitory nature of special items can only be 
inferred from the separate disclosure of such items, but the effects on ‘normal’ profit 
cannot be explicitly shown. Firms in the U.K. were required under FRS 3 Reporting 
Financial Performance2 to distinguish transitory earnings by disclosing as separate line 
items in the income statement ‘exceptional items’.  However, whilst firms had to 
disclose detailed information about exceptional items U.K. firms were prohibited from 
disclosing a sub-total for earnings before exceptional items. As the Australian 
accounting standard allowed presentation of a sub-total for earnings before abnormal 
items, the standard provided firms with a tool to use the abnormal classification to shift 
items from ‘normal earnings’ and focus analysts’ and other users’ attention on that 
‘normal’ earnings number.  
Whilst there is a body of research that examines exceptional items and special items for 
classificatory earnings management, no known prior empirical research has investigated 
whether components of earnings are classified as abnormal for the purposes of intra-
period earnings management. Further, research examining special items typically tests 
for earnings management using only income-decreasing special items (for example, 
Elliott & Hanna, 1996; McVay, 2006), leaving the examination of classification shifting 
using income-increasing special items for future research (McVay, 2006). This study 
extends the earnings management literature by examining both income-increasing and 
income decreasing abnormal items for evidence of intra-period classificatory earnings 
management in the unique Australian setting.  
For a sample of Australian top-500 companies for the period 1994 to 2000, we examine 
associations between abnormal items and: earnings levels, earnings changes, analyst 
following and analysts’ earnings forecast errors. Our findings suggest there is a 
systematic difference between firm-years that reported abnormal items and firm-years 
                                                 
2 Financial Reporting Standard No. 3 (FRS3) regulated the reporting of financial performance by UK firms from   
  1993 until the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005 (Athanasakou et al., 2007).  
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that reported no abnormal items. Consistent with McVay (2006), our evidence suggests 
Australian firms used the abnormal classification to shift abnormal losses from earnings 
before abnormal items to the bottom line net earnings measure of earnings after 
abnormal items earnings (net income).  
The evidence from this study contributes to the accounting change literature. Whilst 
there is growing acceptance of IFRS, there remains conflicting views of the FASB and 
the IASB regarding treatment of unusual or infrequent events or transactions. Hence our 
findings may have implications for the standard setters when considering the 
presentation of earnings components in financial statements. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the classification 
and presentation of earnings components as mandated in accounting standards. Section 
3 presents an overview of the prior literature relevant to the incentives for firms to 
classify items as abnormal and develops testable hypotheses. The research design of the 
study is presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses our empirical results, followed by 
our conclusions in Section 6.  
2. Classification and Presentation of Earnings Components   
Over several decades, accounting standards globally have undergone various 
amendments relating to the classification and presentation of income and expense items. 
Some of those changes were a response by standard setters to what they considered to 
be attempts to manipulate the presentation of earnings information to influence financial 
statement users’ perceptions of firms’ sustainable earnings. Whilst some amendments 
increased the scope for classificatory choices, they were also seen as a means of 
highlighting persistent profitability (Athanasakou et al., 2007). We consider how 
classificatory requirements and presentation of large or unusual items permitted by 
accounting standards have changed over time in the jurisdictions of the U.S., the U.K. 
and Australia. Table 1 summarises the reporting requirements for these jurisdictions. 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
2.1 U.S. – Special Items 
Following the release of Opinion No. 9 by the Accounting Principles Board, U.S. firms 
for the first time were required to distinguish ‘extraordinary items’ from ordinary 
operations.  However, there were many variations in the application of extraordinary 
items and firms were criticised for using the extraordinary items classification to house 
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large losses as the earnings number reported in the financial press was usually income 
before extraordinary items (Deming, 1974). The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) responded by issuing APB 30 Reporting the Results of Operations in 
1973 which introduced the requirement that extraordinary items be both outside normal 
operations and non-recurring. This meant that many items previously classified as 
‘extraordinary’ would now be classified under a separate category of ‘unusual’ or 
infrequently-occurring items (para. 26).  
Although the change to APB 30 had the desired effect of a decrease in the reporting of 
extraordinary items, it was accompanied with an increase in the reporting of unusual 
items and discontinued operations (Jacobs & Herring, 1977). APB 30 refers to these as 
‘unusual items’, but these events or transactions are more commonly referred to as 
‘special items’ and can be disclosed by either a separate line on the income statement or 
by way of note disclosure. Although firms are prohibited from disclosing a sub-total for 
earnings before special items in the financial statements, such pro-forma measures of 
earnings are often emphasised by the U.S. financial press and by financial analysts. 
Furthermore, most earnings announcements in press releases ‘identify special items 
explicitly’ (Elliott & Hanna, 1996: 144) in order to distinguish the transitory nature of 
special items (Burgstahler, Jimbalvo & Shevlin, 2002; Elliott & Hanna, 1996; Kinney & 
Trezevant, 1997) from persistent earnings.  
2.2 U.K. – Exceptional Items 
In the U.K., up until the early 1990s, Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 
(SSAP) 6 required firms to disclose extraordinary items. The Accounting Standards 
Board (ASB) replaced the reporting of extraordinary items by issuing in 1992 FRS 33 
Reporting Financial Performance4 relating to reporting periods ending on or after 22 
June 1993. Prior to FRS 3 being issued, SSAP 3 required the calculation of earnings per 
share to be based on ‘profit after exceptional items5 and before extraordinary items’. 
Firms were accused, however, of recording material one-off (transitory) items as 
‘extraordinary’ if they were expenses or losses and as ‘exceptional’ (above ordinary 
income) if they were transitory revenue or profits thereby maximising the reported 
                                                 
3 FRS3 amended Statement of Standard Accounting Practice No. 3 (SSAP3), issued by the ASB’s predecessor, the 
Accounting Standards Committee (ASC), and superseded SSAP6. 
4 Financial Reporting Standard No. 3 (FRS3) regulated the reporting of financial performance by UK firms from   
  1993 until the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in 2005 (Athanasakou et al., 2007).  
5 “Exceptional items are ‘material items which derive from events or transactions that fall within ordinary activities of 
the company, and which need to be disclosed separately by virtue of their size or incidence if the financial 
statements are to give a true and fair view’” (ASC, 1986, cited in Ballas, 1999). 
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earnings per share which would benefit the firm’s share price (Athanasakou et al., 2007; 
Gore, Pope & Singh, 2007). FRS 3 effectively reclassified all extraordinary items as 
‘exceptional’ and made it clear that the reporting of extraordinary items would be 
extremely rare thus constraining the use of extraordinary items for earnings 
management (Gore et al., 2007). FRS 3 gave firms the discretion to classify items as 
unusual or exceptional allowing firms to distinguish between recurring and transitory 
earnings. However, others argued that the changes ‘encouraged the practice of 
classificatory smoothing’ (Athanasakou et al., 2007: 428).  
The changes brought about by FRS 3 were viewed as counter-productive for two 
reasons. First, the changes in the classification of earnings brought in by FRS 3 meant 
that many items previously disclosed as an extraordinary item would now be treated as 
an exceptional item (Ballas, 1999). Gore et al., (2007) present evidence of U.K. 
companies changing their earnings management strategies subsequent to the issuance of 
FRS 3. Second, an objective of FRS 3 was to re-focus financial statement users away 
from relying on one bottom-line earnings figure as a measure of firms’ performance. 
However, subsequent to the implementation of FRS 3, the Institute of Management and 
Research developed its own earnings measure, being earnings adjusted for 
unusual/exceptional items (Ballas, 1999). An increase in the number of firms reporting 
earnings per share on the basis of earnings before exceptional items followed and 
earnings before exceptional items became the earnings measure used by financial 
analysts and reported on in press releases (Ballas, 1999).  
2.3 Australia – Abnormal Items 
In Australia the accounting standard AAS 1: Profit and Loss Statements (effective 1 
December 1974) made a distinction between operating profit, abnormal items and 
extraordinary items. Extraordinary items were defined as items of revenue and expense, 
and other gains and losses attributable to events or transactions outside the ordinary 
operations of the business entity (para. 4 (d)). Abnormal items (at that time) were 
defined as items of revenue and expense, and other gains and losses, which although 
attributable to the ordinary operations of the business entity, are considered abnormal by 
reason of their size and effect on the results for the period (para. 4 (c)). 
Thus, the distinguishing feature between an extraordinary item and an abnormal item (at 
that time) was that extraordinary items originated outside of the firm’s ordinary 
operations, whereas abnormal items emanated from a firm’s ordinary operations but 
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because of their size and effect warranted separate disclosure. As with their U.S. and 
U.K. counterparts, Australian firms were also perceived as using the extraordinary 
classification to manage earnings by classifying large losses as extraordinary, whereas 
large gains were classified as abnormal items. As the earnings number reported in the 
financial press was typically ‘earnings before extraordinary items’ classifying large 
losses as extraordinary allowed firms to report higher earnings before extraordinary 
items. Empirical research supports the contention that extraordinary items were used to 
manage earnings (see for example, Craig & Walsh, 1989; Godfrey & Jones, 1999; 
Walsh, Craig & Clarke, 1991).  
Australian standard setters took steps to restrict the reporting of extraordinary items. 
The (then named) Australian Standards Review Board (ASRB) reissued AAS 1 in 
conjunction with the issue of ASRB 10186: Profit and Loss Accounts effective for 
financial years ending on or after 31 December 1989 in which the definition of 
extraordinary items was tightened (along similar lines to APB30 in the U.S.), requiring 
extraordinary items to be both attributable to transactions outside the ordinary business 
operations, and non-recurring (ASRB 1018, para. 6).  
To assess the impact of the more stringent definition of extraordinary items contained in 
AASB 1018, Houghton (1994) conducted a study of the changes in reporting of 
extraordinary items and abnormal items by 91 of Australia’s largest companies7 during 
1988 to 1991, representing two years prior and two years after the changes to the 
accounting standard.  
Houghton (1994) found that, on average, extraordinary items in 1988 and 1989 were 
losses, while abnormal items were, on average, gains, but less frequent. Houghton 
(1994) observed a substantial shift in the number and dollar value of both extraordinary 
and abnormal items after the definitional change in 1989. The number of extraordinary 
items dropped by approximately half after the definitional change. In contrast, the 
number of abnormal items doubled from the pre-definitional change of extraordinary 
items years. Houghton’s (1994) evidence suggests that the change in definition made 
extraordinary items a rarer event and concurrently the reporting of abnormal items 
became more frequent.  
                                                 
6 The ASRB series of accounting standards was replaced by the AASB accounting standards series. ASRB 1018 was 
subsequently reissued as AASB 1018. 
7 Based on market capitalisation. 
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Abnormal items also fundamentally changed in nature after the definitional change to 
extraordinary items. Prior to the change, abnormal items were, on average, consistently 
profits, whereas after the change abnormal items were, like extraordinary items, on 
average large losses.  
The high frequency of firms reporting loss items as abnormal drew much criticism in 
the financial press, with comments such as ‘there is no such thing as abnormal profits, 
only abnormal losses’ (Parker and Porter, 2000:66). As earnings before abnormal items 
were generally highlighted in media releases, companies were perceived as using 
abnormal items strategically to smooth and improve reported pre-abnormal earnings 
(Saunders, 1999). Recall, abnormal items were earnings considered to be abnormal due 
to their size and effect on earnings, suggesting only large (material) items qualify for 
classification as abnormal.8 Based on the AASB 1031 materiality thresholds, Cameron 
(2008) examined a sample of 1475 individual abnormal items and found that 27.8% of 
items were immaterial (fell below the 5% materiality threshold) and 16.3% fell into the 
‘grey’ area (5 to 10%) where professional judgement is required to be exercised to 
determine whether the item is material. Thus a substantial proportion of items classified 
as abnormal are either immaterial or borderline material, which is inconsistent with the 
expectation that, by definition, abnormal items are large and therefore clearly material. 
A possible explanation for this finding is that items may have been classified as 
abnormal to increase/decrease earnings before abnormal items up/down to an earnings 
benchmark.9  
The growing concerns over the reporting of abnormal items led to calls for revision of 
the accounting standard so that ‘only the most unusual’ events could be classified as 
abnormal (Saunders, 1999). In its 1999 financial reporting surveillance program, the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC)10  expressed concern that 
there was a lack of information about the nature of items disclosed as abnormal, that 
                                                 
8 The Australian accounting standard AASB 1031 Materiality states: “The notion of materiality influences whether an 
item or an aggregate of items is required to be recognised, measured or disclosed in accordance with the requirements 
of an Australian Accounting Standard” (para 10); and that the size and nature of the items usually need to be 
evaluated together (para. 12).  Whilst paragraph 15 provides quantitative thresholds (<5% not material; >10% 
material) AASB 1031 prefaces these by stating “Materiality is a matter of professional judgement” (para. 15). AASB 
1031 does not refer to amounts falling in the band between 5% and 10%, hence managerial discretion determines how 
items in this band are reported in financial statements. 
9 An alternative explanation for immaterial items being reported as abnormal is that the nature of the items rather than 
their size may have a material effect on financial report users’ decisions. Similar to special/exceptional items in the 
U.S. /U.K. being considered as transitory in nature, managers of Australian firms may have classified earnings as 
abnormal items to signal to financial statement users the transitory nature of those abnormal items. Nevertheless, such 
immaterial items do not meet the AASB 1018 definition of abnormal items as that standard required items to be 
classified abnormal based on their size; the definition does not extend to the nature of the item.  
10 The ASIC is the Australian regulator of public companies.  
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‘normal’ operating expenses were being classified as abnormal to boost pre-abnormal 
earnings, and that mining exploration companies were disclosing all write-offs of 
exploration expenditure as abnormal (McCahey, 1999: 72). These criticisms suggest 
that firms were opportunistically classifying items as ‘abnormal’ to influence financial 
statement users’ perceptions of their earnings.   
In the 1999 revision to AASB 101811 the abnormal items classification was removed 
from the Accounting standards and instead, generally required disclosure of any item 
that was ‘of such a size, nature or incidence that its disclosure is relevant in explaining 
the financial performance of the entity’ (AASB 1018 para. 5.4).12 As there was no 
explicit prohibition on the use of the term ‘abnormal item’, some entities continued to 
use the term when reporting their results to the market.  The ASIC surveillance of 2001 
financial reports identified that companies were still highlighting abnormal items. ASIC 
Chief Accountant, Ian Mackintosh, commented ‘some companies could not kick the 
abnormal habit and singled out ‘abnormal’ or ‘unusual’ items in the Statement of 
Financial Performance itself’ (Mackintosh, 2002: 49). Observations of companies 
continuing to label items as ‘abnormal’ or ‘significant’ in financial reports were also 
identified in the financial press.13    
The persistence by companies of disclosing not only material but also immaterial items 
of revenue and expense as ‘abnormal’, significant’ or ‘unusual’ raises the issue of 
whether the standard setters were justified in removing the ‘abnormal’ classification 
from the accounting standard, and whether companies were opportunistically classifying 
items as abnormal prior to the accounting standard changes. 
3. Prior research and hypothesis development  
U.S. studies find that earnings classified as special items are asymmetric with a bias 
towards negative special items and that they are used to manage reported earnings to 
earnings benchmarks. These benchmarks include the use of special items: to manage 
earnings to avoid reporting an earnings decrease (DeFond & Park, 1997; Kinney & 
                                                 
11  AASB 1018 was reissued in October 1999 as the Statement of Financial Performance and became operative for 
half-years ending on or after 31 December 2000 and for financial years ending on or after 30 June 2001.   
12 The disclosure requirements in AASB 1018 were subsequently superseded by AASB 101, effective 1 January 
2005. AASB 101 is similar to AASB 1018 in its requirement to separately disclose material items; AASB 101, 
para. 86 states: “when items of income and expense are material, their nature and amount shall be disclosed 
separately.”   
13 Examples include: “companies have allocated abnormals exactly as they used to, but have substituted new names” 
(Wilson, 2002: 24); and “until 2000, asset writedowns could be reported separately, as abnormal items. They are 
now called ‘significant items’” (Dunn, 2002: 34). 
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Trezevant, 1997); to manage earnings to avoid reporting a loss (Dechow, Richardson & 
Tuna, 2003); and to manage earnings to meet/beat analysts’ earnings forecasts (Dechow 
et al., 2003). Evidence is also provided of special items being used for ‘classification 
shifting’ (McVay, 2006: 501) within the income statement by classifying core expenses 
as special items, thereby increasing core earnings. U.K. research finds that exceptional 
items were used for classificatory smoothing (Athanasakou et al., 2007) and that larger 
UK firms are more likely to engage in classification shifting, rather than accruals 
management, to avoid negative earnings surprises (Athanasakou et al., 2009). 
3.1 Abnormal Items and Earnings Levels 
DeFond and Park (1997) provide evidence of firms managing current period earnings 
through the use of discretionary accruals to increase or decrease reported earnings, 
depending of whether earnings are high or low. Similarly, Kinney and Trezevant (1997) 
present evidence consistent with special items being used to manage reported earnings. 
They argue that as the end of the financial reporting period approaches, managers 
identify special items that could be recognised should the level of pre-managed earnings 
before special items be higher/lower than the prior year’s earnings. If management’s 
estimate of earnings before special items is well above/below a pre-determined level, 
then management recognises income-decreasing/income-increasing special items. 
Alternatively, if earnings before special items is well below the pre-determined level, 
management recognises income-decreasing special items consistent with a big bath 
strategy. 
McVay (2006) provides evidence of core operating expenses being classified as special 
items, where results for her sample firms show that approximately 2.2% of reported 
special items are, on average, part of the current period’s ‘core’ earnings, thereby 
increasing the current period’s reported core earnings. Athanasakou et al.’s (2007) U.K. 
findings show an increase in classificatory smoothing using exceptional items post-
FRS3.  
In line with the findings from the U.S. and U.K. that special and exceptional items can 
be used to manage earnings, abnormal items could have been similarly used to manage 
earnings in Australia. While the superseded accounting standard AASB 1018 required 
abnormally large earnings items to be classified as ‘abnormal’ and separately disclosed, 
managers had considerable discretion in determining whether the size of a revenue or 
expense transaction met the definition of an abnormal item.  For example where a firm’s 
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earnings before abnormal items (before manipulation) were below analysts’ forecasts, 
an expense item within earnings before abnormal items could have been be re-classified 
as an abnormal item, thereby increasing earnings before abnormal items to a given 
target. Alternatively, if pre-managed earnings before abnormal items were higher than 
the desired level, a revenue item could have been classified as abnormal, thus 
decreasing pre-abnormal earnings. Given that firms have different incentives to manage 
earnings and that both expense and revenue items could have been reclassified as 
abnormal to manage earnings, no direction is predicted for the association between 
abnormal items and pre-abnormal earnings. It is hypothesised: 
H1a:  Prior to 2001, the level of earnings before abnormal items is associated 
with whether firms reported abnormal items in that reporting period. 
H1b:  For firms that reported abnormal items, the level of earnings before 
abnormal items is associated with the amount of reported abnormal 
items in that reporting period.  
 
3.2 Abnormal Items and Earnings Changes  
Just as profit firms versus loss firms have different characteristics and therefore 
different incentives to manage earnings, the sign of the change in earnings could also be 
a determining factor in earnings management decisions. In addition to the sign of the 
change, the magnitude of the change in a firm’s reported earnings from one period to 
the next is likely to influence whether managers engage in earnings management to 
manipulate reported earnings for the current and future periods. For example, Kinney 
and Trezevant (1997) provide evidence of managers recognising special items to 
mitigate the magnitude of the inter-period change in earnings. 
 
Godfrey and Jones (1999) suggest that stable but steadily increasing earnings are likely 
to enhance managers’ job security. Thus, managers will seek to smooth reported income 
by boosting earnings in poor earnings years while in good performance years they 
‘save’ to boost earnings in future poorer years. While DeFond and Park (1997: 118) 
argue that a firm’s current period performance and expected future period performance 
relative to industry averages are the relevant motivating factors for managers to smooth 
income, they acknowledge that ‘within-firm longitudinal relative performance’ is an 
alternative explanation. Similar to U.S. findings that firms reported special items to 
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move current year earnings closer to prior year’s earnings to achieve steady growth in 
earnings (see Kinney & Trezevant, 1997), Australian firms may have re-classified items 
as abnormal to shift them from pre-abnormal earnings and thus mitigate the change in 
pre-abnormal earnings between the current and the prior period.  Therefore, it is 
hypothesised: 
H2a:  Prior to 2001, the change in earnings before abnormal items is 
associated with whether firms reported abnormal items in that reporting 
period. 
H2b:  For firms that reported abnormal items, the change in earnings before 
abnormal items is associated with the amount of reported abnormal 
items in that reporting period. 
   
3.3 Analyst Following and Analyst Forecasts  
Analysts’ forecasts have become increasingly important as a benchmark for assessing 
firms’ performance, with the following of companies’ securities by financial analysts 
viewed as having a strong effect on investors’ perceptions and the market valuation of 
firms followed (Matsumoto, 2002). The prominence of earnings information to 
investors’ evaluation of a firm’s performance makes the forecasting of corporate 
earnings an essential product to the investing community (Beaver, 1998), creating 
incentives for firms to maintain analyst following. Empirical evidence presented by 
Myers, Myers and Skinner (2007) indicates that firms benefit from earnings 
management by a greater analyst following, fewer revisions and lower dispersion of 
analysts’ forecasts, and a reduction in the magnitude and likelihood of earnings 
surprises.  
Shareholders also benefit when analysts’ forecasts are met. Kasznik and McNichols 
(1999) found that firms that consistently meet earnings expectations benefit by way of a 
valuation premium, and that companies that meet or beat earnings expectations report 
higher earnings in future periods. Bartov, Givoly & Hayn, (2002) and  Lopez and Rees 
(2002)  report that investors reward firms whose earnings meet or beat analysts’ 
forecasts with a higher average quarterly return than firms that fail to meet forecasts.  
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Lopez and Rees (2002) conclude their evidence is consistent with the notion that market 
incentives motivate managers to manage earnings so as to consistently meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts.  
Dechow et al. (2003) find that firms report an unusual level of special items when firms 
are minimising losses and for firms avoiding forecast errors.  Documented evidence is 
consistent with companies using special/exceptional items to manage their earnings to 
meet analysts’ forecasts, (Athanasakou et al., 2009; Kasznik & McNichols, 1999) and 
that firms that consistently meet earnings forecasts benefit by way of a valuation 
premium (Kasznik & McNichols, 1999), thereby providing incentives for firms to 
manage earnings to meet or beat forecasts. Furthermore, avoiding negative earnings 
surprises appears to dominate as an incentive over avoiding reporting of losses and 
earnings decreases (Brown & Caylor, 2005).  
In Australia, financial analysts focused on earnings before abnormal items when 
evaluating firms’ performance (Saunders, 1999). Furthermore, it was reported that even 
though ‘abnormal items’ had been removed from Australian accounting standards, 
financial analysts would continue to run models using pre-abnormal earnings as pre-
abnormal earnings represented recurring earnings (Schulze, 2001).   Firms with analyst 
following therefore have greater incentives to manage their reported pre-abnormal 
earnings by classifying items as abnormal. Thus it could be expected that firms that 
have analyst following are more likely to report abnormal items than firms not followed 
by analysts. Analyst following is also likely to have explained the relatively high 
incidence of firms that disclosed pre-abnormal earnings per share,14 and motivated firms 
to align earnings before abnormal items to analysts’ forecasts. As share prices adjust to 
information conveyed in analysts’ forecasts, managers may be motivated to ensure that 
those analysts’ forecasts and reported earnings are aligned.  
Abnormal items could have been used to manage reported earnings before abnormal 
items to minimise deviations between reported earnings and analysts’ forecasts, thereby 
minimising analyst forecast errors. It is expected that firms with analyst following were 
                                                 
14 AASB 1027 (as applying during the study period from 1994 to 2000) did not require disclosure of earnings per 
share (EPS) excluding abnormal items. However, in addition to reporting EPS including abnormal items as required 
by AASB 1027, many firms voluntarily disclosed EPS excluding abnormal items as a measure of the firm’s 
performance. Of the 59 sample firms used in Cameron and Gallery’s (2001) study, 22 (37%) voluntarily disclosed 




more likely to have reported abnormal items, and for those firms with an analyst 
following, the amount of abnormal items was associated with analyst forecast errors. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised: 
H3a:  Prior to 2001, firms with analyst following were more likely to report 
abnormal items. 
H3b:  For firms with analyst following, firms reporting abnormal items were 
likely to meet/beat analysts’ forecasts. 
H3c:  For firms that reported abnormal items, the amount of abnormal items is 
associated with whether the firm had an analyst following. 
H3d:  For firms that reported abnormal items and with analyst following, the 
amount of abnormal items is associated with whether analysts’ forecasts 
were met. 
4. Research Method  
The study period extends over seven years from 1994 to 2000, as 2000 was the last year 
in which AASB 1018 prescribed disclosure of abnormal items, and financial data 
availability was limited for years prior to 1994. The sample was also limited to the top-
500 Australian public companies (ranked by market capitalisation), due to data 
availability constraints. Financial statement data for sample firms were hand-collected 
from the ASX FinData, Aspect and Connect 4 databases, and share price data was 
sourced from the Datastream database. After excluding observations with missing data, 
foreign domiciled firms and trusts, the final sample comprises 416 companies and 2,177 
firm–year observations. Analysts’ forecasts were sourced from the ‘I/B/E/S’ 
International Consensus Forecasts file. Of the full sample of 2177 firm–years, 910 had 
analysts’ forecasts, of which 513 firm–years reported abnormal items.  
We predict associations between whether a firm reported abnormal items and the level 
of current period earnings (H1a), the change between current and prior year pre-
abnormal earnings (H2a) and analyst following (H3a).  Logistic regression Model 1 is 
estimated to test for these associations, together with controls for size, industry, audit 
quality and loss firms. 
PRAITit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Dit + a5SIZEit 
+ a6INDit + a7AUDit + a8PROF/LOSSit + it     (1) 
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PRAIT represents the incidence of abnormal items and is coded one for firm-years 
reporting abnormal items, and zero otherwise. Earnings before abnormal items (EBAI) 
is measured as earnings after income tax and before abnormal items, scaled by 
beginning-of-the-year market capitalisation. Earnings change is represented by two 
variables to separately capture the magnitude of the change and the direction of the 
change. The magnitude of the change variable is the absolute value of the change in 
earnings before abnormal items (|EBAI|) and is measured as the change between 
earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items for 
firm-yeart0, scaled by beginning-of-the-year market capitalisation. The direction of 
earnings change variable (EBAI_SIGN) is coded one where the change between 
earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items for 
firm-yeart0 is positive, and zero otherwise.  FC_D is a dichotomous variable where firm-
years with analyst following are coded one, and zero otherwise.   
To control for firm-specific factors that may be associated with reporting abnormal 
items, four control variables are included in regression models. To control for the 
differing incentives that large firms have compared to small firms to manage earnings, 
the variable SIZE is included and measured as the natural logarithm of balance date total 
assets. As mining firms may have different financial profiles from other listed firms 
(Carey & Simnett, 2006), and given that mining firms were singled out by ASIC in their 
annual report surveillance for classifying write-offs as abnormal items, the variable IND 
controls for differing incentives faced by mining firms, coded one for mining firms and 
zero otherwise. AUD is a dichotomous variable and controls for the influence of audit 
quality with Big-6 auditors15 coded one and zero otherwise. To control for the differing 
incentives of profit versus loss firms, the variable PROF/LOSS is included, where profit 
(before abnormal items) firm-years are coded one and loss (before abnormal items) 
firm-years coded zero. To control for economy-wide effects that could influence the 
reporting of abnormal items year dummy variables are included in regression models. 
For firms with analyst following, H3b predicts an association between whether firms 
reported abnormal items and whether analysts’ forecasts are met. Accordingly, FC_Met 
enters Model 2.    
                                                 
15The Big-6 auditors are Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
or its predecessor firms, Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand.  
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PRAITit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Metit + 
a5ANALYST_Nit + a6SIZEit + a7INDit + a8AUDit + a9PROF/LOSSit + it (2) 
FC_Met is a dichotomous variable coded one for firms that met/beat the earnings 
forecast, and zero for firms that missed the earnings forecast. The forecast error is 
measured as the difference between earnings before abnormal items and the earnings 
forecast (Bartov et al., 2002). Just as the presence of an analyst forecast may influence 
the reporting an abnormal item, the number of analysts following a firm may also 
influence the reporting of abnormal items. The greater the number of analysts the 
“greater the degree of scrutiny”16, providing incentives to report abnormal items to align 
earnings with forecasts. To control for this factor ANALYST_N enters Model 2 and is 
measured as the number of analysts following the firm in the relevant year. All other 
variables in Model 2 are the same as Model 1.  
For firms that report abnormal items, we predict associations between the amount of 
abnormal items and the level of current period earnings before abnormal items (H1b), 
the change between current and prior year earnings before abnormal items (H2b), and 
analyst following (H3c). Regression Model 3 is estimated to test for these associations, 
together with the same control variables as in Model 1. 
TAIit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Dit + a5SIZEit + 
a6INDit + a7AUDit + a8PROF/LOSSit + it     (3) 
TAI is the net aggregate amount of abnormal items17 reported by sample firms in year t, 
scaled by beginning-of-the-year market capitalisation.  
Model 4 tests the H3d prediction that for those firms that report abnormal items and 
have analyst following, the amount of abnormal items is associated with whether 
analysts’ forecasts are met. 
TAIit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Metit + 
a5ANALYST_Nit + a6SIZEit + a7INDit + a8AUDit + a9PROF/LOSSit + it (4) 
 
5. Results  
                                                 
16 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
17 Firms could report multiple abnormal items in a given year, of which they may be all income-increasing, all 
income-decreasing or a combination of income-increasing and income-decreasing abnormal items. TAI therefore 
represents the net total amount of abnormal items reported in the given firm-year.    
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5.1 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis  
Table 2 presents summary descriptive statistics18 for the study variables with statistics 
for the continuous variables for firm-years with abnormal items presented in Panel A, 
and firm-years with no abnormal items in Panel B. Consistent with findings of U.S. 
research where the magnitude of income-decreasing special items exceeds that of 
income-increasing special items and with prior research using Australian data (Cameron 
& Gallery, 2008), Panel A shows that both the mean (−0.035) and median (−0.007) 
reported abnormal items are negative. Panel C reports results of tests of differences 
between the means for the independent variables and indicate that firms with abnormal 
items have a larger analyst following (ANALYST_N, t = -6.007, p< 0.01) and tend to be 
larger (SIZE) than firms with no abnormal items (t = -3.529, p< 0.01). The net income 
(NI) of firms with no abnormal items tends to be higher than both net income (NI) and 
earnings before abnormal items (EBAI) of firms that report abnormal items (t = 10.342, 
p< 0.01 and t = 7.880, p< 0.01, respectively). The negative change in NI for firms with 
no abnormal items and the change in earnings before abnormal items (EBAI) for those 
with abnormal items is not significantly different. However, the change in net income 
(NI) between the two samples shows that firms with abnormal items experience a 
larger negative change in bottom line net income (mean = -0.021) than firms with no 
abnormal items (mean = -0.003). This difference is statistically significant (t = 2.167, p< 
0.05) and reflects the larger than average negative impact of abnormal items on the 
bottom line.  
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 3 shows the frequencies of the dichotomous variables for the two groupings of 
firm-years that reported abnormal items or had no abnormal items. The direction of the 
earnings change between the two samples is not significant. However, a higher 
proportion of firm-years reporting abnormal items had an analyst following (44.2%), 
compared to 39% (397) of firm-years that did not report abnormal items. This difference 
is statistically significant (χ2 = 5.77, p< 0.05), providing preliminary evidence that firms 
with analysts following were more likely to report abnormal items. Firm-years reporting 
                                                 
18 To mitigate the influence of outliers, extreme values were winsorised.  As recommended by Tabachnick & Fidell 
(2001) this process was limited to 5% of the observations for each variable. A logarithmic transformation was 
effective in correcting the distribution of the variable SIZE. For robustness, statistical tests are run with outliers 
deleted from the sample to ensure results do not hinge on either of the 2 design choices in regard to winsorising as 




abnormal items were less likely to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts (55.4%) compared 
with those with no abnormal items (65.2%) (χ2 = 9.08, p< 0.01). A higher proportion of 
firms with abnormal items are mining firms (27.7%) than those with no abnormal items 
(20.6%). Those with abnormal items are also less likely to be audited by a Big-6 auditor 
(73.9% compared with 79.4%), and less likely to have reported a profit (76.7% 
compared with 86.4%). Overall, these results indicate that there are systematic 
differences between firms with and without abnormal items, on a univariate basis.   
[TABLE 3 HERE] 
A bivariate correlation matrix for all variables included in the regression models is 
presented in Table 4, Panel A for the full sample of firm-years (n = 2177) and in  Panel 
B for the firms reporting abnormal items (n = 1160). All correlations among the 
independent variables are below acceptable conventional levels and therefore 
collinearity does not appear to pose a threat to the interpretation of regression 
coefficients of the independent variables.   
[TABLE 4 HERE] 
All the correlations between whether the firm reported abnormal items (PRAIT) and the 
independent variables shown in Table 4, Panel A, are consistent with the other 
univariate results reported for Tables 2 and 3.  For the sub-sample of firms that reported 
abnormal items (Panel B of Table 4), correlations between the amount of abnormal 
items (TAI) and the test variables show that earning before abnormal items EBAI (r = 
0.163; p < 0.01), the earnings change |EBAI| (r = -0.159; p < 0.01) and analyst 
following (FC_D) (r = 0.049; p < 0.10) are associated with the amount of abnormal 
items.  However, no significant association is found between TAI and the sign of the 
earnings change (EBAI_SIGN), or whether analysts’ forecasts were met/beaten 
(FC_Met). From these results it appears that analyst following was a determinant of 
both the reporting of and magnitude of abnormal items.  .  
5.2 Multivariate Analysis  
Table 5 reports the logistic regression results for tests of Model (1) for the full sample, 
and Model (2) for the sub-sample with analyst following; for comparative purposes, the 
third column reports results of logistic regression tests for the sub-sample with no 
analyst following. As found in the univariate tests, the regression results for the full 
sample suggest that firms that had lower levels of earnings before abnormal items were 
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more likely to report abnormal items (EBAI: z = -4.681, p < 0.01). While there is no 
significant association with the magnitude of the pre-abnormal earnings change 
(|EBAI|), the direction of the change is positive and significant (EBAI_SIGN: z = 
2.673, p < 0.01), indicating that firms with an increase in pre-abnormal earnings from 
the previous year were more likely to report abnormal items. Firms with analyst 
following (FC_D: z = 1.697, p < 0.10) were also more likely to report abnormal items. 
These results provide support for H1a, H2a and H3a. Consistent with the univariate 
results, the significant positive coefficients for SIZE (z = 5.568, p < 0.01) and IND (z = 
2.294, p < 0.5) indicate that larger firms and those in the mining industry were more 
likely to report abnormal items. Significant negative coefficients for AUD and 
PROF/LOSS (z = -4.881, p < 0.01 and z = -2.920, p < 0.01, respectively) indicate that 
firms reporting abnormal items were less likely to be audited by a Big 6 audit firm, and 
more likely to be a loss-firm.  
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5 presents regression test results of Model 2 for the two 
sub-samples of firms with analyst following and firms with no analyst following 
respectively. The results of Model (2) for both sub-samples (columns 2 and 3) for the 
test variables EBAI and |EBAI| are consistent with the full sample. For the sub-sample 
of firm-years with analyst following the positive coefficient for EBAI_SIGN (z = 
2.197, p < 0.05) and negative coefficient for FC_Met (z = -1.853, p < 0.10), suggests 
that firms with a positive change in pre-abnormal earnings levels and those that 
achieved analysts’ forecasts were less likely to report abnormal items. The positive 
coefficient for the control variable ANALYST_N suggests the greater the number of 
analysts following a firm the more likely the firm is to report an abnormal item. Results 
for the remaining control variables for both sub-samples are similar to the full sample.  
[TABLE 5 HERE] 
Table 6 presents the results of tests of Model (3) for all firms with abnormal items, and 
Model (4) for firms with abnormal items and analyst following, where the dependent 
variable in both models is the amount of abnormal items (TAI).19 For all firms (Table 6, 
                                                 
19 Multicollinearity of the variables was assessed using the measures of Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor. 
Results of both these tests (not tabulated) shows that all variables are well within the accepted thresholds indicating 
there were no multicollinearity problems. To ensure that the results for the pooled regression results are not affected 
by autocorrelation in the data a Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test was conducted to determine whether the panel data 
should be tested using the classic regression model or a fixed/random effects model (Greene, 2003). The result of the 
LM test for several of the sub-samples is significant, indicating that the random effects model should be used. The 
random effects model was run for those sub-samples and as the results are qualitatively the same as the classical 
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Column 1), the coefficient for earnings level (EBAI) and analyst following (FC_D) is 
not statistically significant and therefore H1b and H3c are rejected. The negative and 
significant coefficient for the magnitude of earnings change (|EBAI|; t = -4.023; p < 
0.01) and non-significant coefficient for direction of the earnings change (EBAI_SIGN) 
suggests that firms reporting larger amounts of abnormal items, on average, had smaller 
changes in pre-abnormal earnings, irrespective of the sign of the earnings change 
(higher or lower than the prior year). This result provides support for H2b, indicating 
that firms may have reclassified revenue and expense items as abnormal to shift them 
from pre-abnormal earnings and thus mitigate the magnitude of the pre-abnormal 
earnings change.  The significant positive coefficient for PROF/LOSS (t = 3.695 p < 
0.01) suggests that profit firms were more likely to report larger amounts of abnormal 
gains, and loss firms more likely to report large abnormal losses.  
 
[TABLE 6 HERE] 
Hayn (1995) argues that earnings management incentives differ between firms 
depending on differences in their economic characteristics. Thus firms may have 
competing incentives to report abnormal gains and abnormal losses, depending on the 
earnings level of the firm (profit or loss) and the direction of the earnings change 
(increase or decrease). To explore effects of differing reporting incentives, Model (3) is 
retested on the sub-samples of firms reporting abnormal gains and abnormal losses; the 
results are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 6. Partitioning the sample 
significantly improves the explanatory power of Model (3), with the adjusted R2 
increasing from 7.2% for the overall sample, to 25.3% for the abnormal gains sub-
sample and 16.9% for the abnormal loss sub-sample.  
The results in Column 2 show that firms reporting larger amounts of abnormal gains 
have higher pre-abnormal earnings (EBAI; t = 1.692; p < 0.10) and tend to have larger 
changes in pre-abnormal earnings (|EBAI|; t = 7.169; p < 0.01). This could reflect the 
shifting of gains from pre-abnormal earnings to abnormal gains to reduce reported pre-
abnormal earnings for the current year and the benchmark earnings for the following 
year. The significant negative coefficient for FC_D (t = -1.887; p < 0.10) suggests that 
firms with an analyst following were more likely to report lower abnormal gains, given 
                                                                                                                                               
regressions model, only the classical regression model results are reported. The absence of serial correlation in the 
data was also confirmed by Durbin-Watson tests for the full sample.  
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that TAI is on average negative.  Firms with larger amounts of abnormal gains also tend 
to be smaller (SIZE; t = -2.403; p < 0.01), more likely to have made a loss 
(PROF/LOSS; t = -2.992, p < 0.01), and firms that were audited by a Big-6 auditor 
(AUD; t = 2.807, p < 0.01).  
The results for firms reporting abnormal losses (Column 3) show a significantly 
negative coefficient for the magnitude of the change in pre-abnormal earnings (|EBAI|; 
t = -7.201; p < 0.01), suggesting that firms reporting larger amounts of abnormal losses 
tended to have smaller changes in pre-abnormal earnings. This finding again indicates 
that firms may have reclassified normal expense items as abnormal losses to dampen 
changes in pre-abnormal earnings.   
Results for Model (4) are reported in columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 6. For all firms 
with an analyst following (Column 4) and each of the subsamples of firms reporting 
abnormal gains and losses (columns 5 and 6, respectively), the coefficient for whether 
analysts’ forecasts were met (FC_Met) is not statistically significant, and therefore H3d 
is rejected. Unlike Model 2, the control variable ANALYST_N is not significant 
indicating that the number of analysts following the firm is not associated with the 
magnitude of reported abnormal items. Results for the other test variables and controls 
are generally consistent with the results for all firms, except that in relation to the 
magnitude of earnings change (|EBAI|), the coefficient for firms with abnormal gains 
is not significant, whereas for those with abnormal losses, |EBAI| is significantly 
negative (t = -2.812, p < 0.01). Thus, firms with analyst following and smaller earnings 
changes, on average, reported larger amounts of abnormal losses. Again, this result is 
consistent with firms reclassifying expense items as abnormal losses to mitigate inter-
period changes in pre-abnormal earnings.  
Taken together, the results reported in Table 6 suggest that the magnitude of earnings 
changes dominated as an earnings benchmark and incentive to reclassify income and 
expense items as abnormal. Those firms also tended to be loss firms. Also, firms in the 
mining industry tended to report more abnormal losses.  
 
6. Conclusion  
Unlike other jurisdictions, prior to 2001 Australian accounting standards permitted (and 
encouraged) presentation of a separate ‘earnings before abnormal items’ line item on the 
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face of the income statement. This mandatory requirement to classify and disclose items 
as ‘abnormal’ provides a unique setting to investigate intra-period classificatory 
earnings management.  
Based on a sample of top-500 firms for the period 1994 to 2000, we investigate whether 
firms classified items as abnormal to meet the common earnings benchmarks that have 
been reported in the literature as creating incentives for firms to manage earnings: 
earnings levels, inter-period earnings changes and analysts’ forecasts. Whether there are 
differences in reporting of abnormal items for firms with and without analyst following 
is also examined. Overall, the evidence supports our predictions, indicating that firms 
reporting abnormal items were more likely to have lower levels of earnings, positive 
changes in earnings and analyst following, than firms with no reported abnormal items. 
For the sample of firms with abnormal items, it was found that the magnitude of 
earnings changes was consistently associated with amounts of abnormal items, 
suggesting that revenue and expense items may have been reclassified as abnormal to 
mitigate the magnitude of changes in pre-abnormal earnings. Further, the full sample of 
firms has, on average, reported abnormal losses thereby shifting losses from pre-
abnormal earnings to bottom-line net income. This reclassification strategy which 
enhanced earnings before abnormal items was the earnings performance measure 
typically focused on by analysts and other market participants when abnormal items 
disclosures were mandated by Australian accounting standards. 
These findings suggest that the standard setters were justified in removing the 
‘abnormal’ classification from the accounting standard. However, it cannot be assumed 
that all firms acted opportunistically in the classification of items as abnormal. As 
Macleay (1999: 32) stated, the abnormal items classification allowed ‘an investor to 
determine the maintainable earnings of a company’ enabling a more informed decision 
in regard to investors buy/sell decisions on the basis of firms’ future profitability. With 
the removal of the standardised classification of items outside normal operations as 
‘abnormal’, firms lost the opportunity to use such disclosures as a signalling device, 
with the consequential effect of limiting the scope of effectively communicating 
information about the nature of items presented in financial reports.  
Since adopting international standards, Australian firms are required to disclose 
‘material’ items of income and expense (IAS 1, paragraph 97), and are permitted 
additional sub-totals in the statement of comprehensive income (IAS 1, paragraph 85), 
 24
which might reflect earnings before the disclosed ‘material’ items. However, in the 
absence of a standardised classification of such items, there are likely to be 
inconsistencies between firms in how they present these items and increased uncertainty 
about whether the items are transitory, thus reducing the usefulness of such disclosures 
to users. The extent to which this is the case is an opportunity for further research.        
The controversy on how components of earnings should be classified and disclosed 
continues. In the Discussion Paper Preliminary Views on Financial Statement 
Presentation, the FASB’s preliminary view is that ‘an entity should present information 
about unusual or infrequent events or transactions’ (para. 4.48) ‘so that managers can 
inform users about components within a line item … that are less persistent and more 
subjective than the rest of the components in that line item.’ (para 4.50). This statement 
infers the need for a standardised and consistent approach to disclosure of such items. 
The IASB however, does not support the FASB view ‘because there is no notion of 
unusual or infrequent events or transactions in IFRSs’ (para 4.53). These markedly 
different positions of two powerful standard setting bodies suggests any resolution of 
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  Consolidated  Woolworths Limited  
  52 weeks 52 weeks 52 weeks 52 weeks 
  ended ended ended ended 
  27 June 99 28 June 98 27 June 99 28 June 98 
 Note $m $m $m $m 
      
Revenue from operating activities 2 18,765.5 17,106.3 6,524.7 6,004.2 
Revenue from outside the operating activities 2 159.9 175.6 212.3 140.8 
Total Revenue  18,925.4 17,281.9 6,737.0 6,145.0 
Earnings before interest, abnormal items and tax 3 539.4 516.2 395.7 345.5 
Net finance costs 4 (45.5) (42.8) (45.2) (43.0) 
Operating profit before abnormal      
items and income tax  493.9 473.4 350.5 302.5 
Abnormal items 5 (86.4) (33.0) (86.4) (33.0) 
Operating profit before income tax  407.5 440.4 264.1 269.5 
Income tax expense 7 (150.2) (160.8) (35.0) (44.7) 
Operating profit after income tax  257.3 279.6 229.1 224.8 
Outside equity interests in operating profit  (0.3) (0.2) - - 
Operating Profit Attributable to the Members      
of Woolworths Limited  257.0 279.4 229.1 224.8 
Retained profits at beginning of the period  512.8 426.9 75.4 44.1 
Dividends provided for or paid 8 (207.2) (193.5) (207.2) (193.5) 




Comparison of the Reporting Requirements for Earnings Akin to Abnormal Items 
(as the standard applied during the study period) to International Jurisdictions 
 U.S. U.K. Australia 
Accounting  
Pronouncement 
APB 30 Reporting the Results of Operations FRS 3 Reporting 
Financial Performance 
AASB 1018 Profit and Loss Accounts 
 Unusual/Special Items 2 categories of 
Exceptional Items 
Abnormal Items 
Trigger Material event or transaction unusual in nature or 
occur infrequently, but not both. 
Material items that derive 
from events or 
transactions that fall 
within the entity’s 
ordinary activities and 
need to be disclosed due 
to their size or incidence. 
Earnings included in operating profit 
or loss which are considered abnormal 
by reason of their size & effect on the 
operating profit or loss. 
Disclosure Separate line item on the Income Statement or by 
way of note. 
Category 1: On the face of 
the profit and loss, 
immediately below 
operating profit. 
Category 2: Reported 
under appropriate 
statutory format headings 
with separate disclosure in 
the notes. 
On the face of the profit and loss 
statements or in the notes. 
Examples  
Provided by  
the Standard  
Setters 
Special items are not formally defined. Rather, 
Compustat determines the composition of special 
items. Compustat’s definition of special items 
comprises items identified by Compustat from 
the income statement and the accompanying 
footnotes in the financial statements (and are 
reported by Compustat as data item number 32). 
 
Category 1:  
- profit or loss on 
termination of an activity; 
- costs of a fundamental 
reorganisation; 
- profit or loss on disposal 
of fixed assets. 
“major”: 
- bad debt write-offs; 
- inventory write-downs;  
- write-offs of research & development 
expenses 
- depreciation adjustments; 
- gains and losses from the sale of 
investments or properties; 
- differences on movements in foreign 
currency exchange rates. 
Prohibitions on 
Disclosure 
Prohibits disclosure of sub-total for earnings 
before special items. 
Prohibits disclosure of a 
sub-total for earnings 
before exceptional items. 
None. Standard allowed disclosure of a 
sub-total for earnings before abnormal 
items and a total for earnings after 
abnormal items.  
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 Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables 
 
Panel A: With Abnormal Items 
Variable n Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
TAI            1160 -0.035 -0.007 0.092 -0.318 0.091
EBAI         1160 0.054 0.063 0.112 -0.243 0.504
 EBAI      1160 -0.008 -0.004 0.104 -0.350 0.328
|EBAI| 1160 0.062 0.029 0.084 0.000 0.350
NI 1160 0.023 0.056 0.178 -0.473 0.505
NI      1160 -0.021 -0.009 0.210 -0.623 0.567
ANALYST_N 513 8.860 9 4.768 1 19
SIZE 1160 12.320 12.021 2.069 6.580 19.660
Panel B: No Abnormal Items 
Variable 
 
n Mean Median Std Dev Minimum Maximum
NI  1017 0.092 0.078 0.135 -0.473 0.505
NI   1017 -0.003 -0.003 0.168 -0.623 0.567
|EBAI| 1017 0.072 0.035 0.091 0.000 0.350
ANALYST_N 397 7.010 6 4.472 1 20
SIZE   1017 12.026 11.752 1.818 6.790 19.350
Panel C: Tests of Differences- With Abnormal Items versus No Abnormal Items 
 t-statistic 
(p value) 
MW z- statistic 
(p value)




























TAI = Total abnormal items reported in year t, scaled by market capitalisation; EBAI = Earnings before 
abnormal items in year t, scaled by market capitalisation;  EBAI = Change between earnings before 
abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items firm-yeart0 scaled by market 
capitalisation; |EBAI|= Change between earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings 
before abnormal items firm-yeart0 scaled by market capitalisation; NI = Net earnings for firm-yeart scaled 
by market capitalisation; NI = Change between net earnings for firm-yeart-1 and net earnings firm-yeart0 
scaled by market capitalisation (0); ANALYST_N = The number of analysts following the firm in the 
relevant year; SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Dichotomous variables 
 With an Abnormal Items No Abnormal Items 
Variable 
0 % 1 % 0 % 1 
 
% 2 p-value 
EBAI_SIGN 634 54.7 526 45.3 562 55.3 455 44.7 0.080 0.796 
FC_D 647 55.8 513 44.2 620 61.0 397 39.0 5.77 0.016 
FC_Met (n=910) 229 44.6 284 55.4 138 34.8 259 65.2 9.08 0.003 
IND  839 72.3 321 27.7 808 79.4 209 20.6 14.92 0.000 
AUD  303 26.1 857 73.9 209 20.6 808 79.4 9.35 0.002 
PROF/LOSS  (firms) 270 23.3 890 76.7 138 13.6 879 86.4 33.53 0.000 
EBAI_SIGN = change between earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items 
for firm-yeart0 is positive (1) , otherwise (0); FC_D = Firm-years accompanied by an analyst forecast (1), otherwise 
(0); FC_Met = Met/beat analysts’ forecast (1), otherwise (0); IND = Mining (1), Other (0); AUD = Big 6 Audit Firm 
(1), otherwise (0); PROF/LOSS = Firms reporting a profit before abnormal items (1),  Firms reporting a loss before 
abnormal items (0). 
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Table 4 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients and (two-tailed) p-values in Upper Right Diagonal and Spearman 
Correlation Coefficients and (two-tailed) p-values in Lower Left Diagonal  
 
Panel A: Full Sample (n=2177) 
  










SIZE IND AUD PROF/ 
LOSS 
PRAIT  1 -0.168 -0.057 0.006 0.052 -0.100 0.087 0.075 0.083 -0.066 -0.124 
   0.000 0.008 0.777 0.014 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 
EBAI -0.174 1 0.173 0.236 0.114 0.388 0.108 0.189 -0.230 -0.006 0.628 
 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.787 0.000 
|EBAI| -0.050 0.128 1 -0.012 -
0.210 
0.094 -0.202 -0.232 0.011 -0.046 -0.171 
 0.019 0.000   0.589 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.620 0.032 0.000 
EBAI_SIGN 0.006 0.254 -0.049 1 0.000 0.182 -0.007 -0.023 0.018 0.000 0.127 
 0.777 0.000 0.021  0.996 0.000 0.727 0.277 0.412 0.977 0.000 
FC_D 0.052 0.131 -0.167 0.000 1  0.954 0.496 -0.053 0.182 0.276 
 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.996    0.000 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 
FC_Met -0.100 0.477 0.064 0.182  1 0.034 0.099 -0.079 0.039 0.215 
 0.003 0.000 0.052 0.000    0.312 0.003 0.017 0.236 0.000 
ANALYST_N 0.087 0.108 -0.202 -0.007 0.954 0.034 1 0.658 0.005 0.216 0.254 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.312  0.000 0.813 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 0.076 0.212 -0.236 -0.021 0.538 0.101 0.623 1 -0.124 0.237 0.393 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.317 0.000 0.002 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 
IND 0.083 -0.308 0.035 0.018 -
0.053 
-0.079 -0.027 -0.117 1 0.055 -0.265 
 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.412 0.013 0.017 0.205 0.000   0.011 0.000 
AUD -0.066 -0.024 -0.033 0.000 0.182 0.039 0.209 0.250 0.055 1 0.070 
 0.002 0.272 0.128 0.977 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.000 0.011   0.001 
PROF/LOSS -0.124 0.676 -0.144 0.127 0.276 0.215 0.281 0.407 -0.265 0.070 1 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001  
            
Panel B: Firm Years with Abnormal items  (n=1160)








SIZE IND AUD PROF/LOSS 
TAI 1 0.163 -0.159 0.044 0.049 0.060 0.088 0.125 -0.090 0.004 0.227 
  0.000 0.000 0.133 0.098 0.173 0.003 0.000 0.002 0.904 0.000 
EBAI 0.145 1 -0.039 0.259 0.185 0.391 0.142 0.300 -0.218 0.020 0.684 





0.057 -0.255 -0.257 0.011 -0.103 -0.249 
 0.000 0.472  0.305 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.707 0.000 0.000 
EBAI_SIGN 0.052 0.281 -0.078 1 0.005 0.216 -0.003 -0.006 -0.002 -0.010 0.182 
 0.078 0.000 0.008  0.870 0.000 0.922 0.834 0.942 0.727 0.000 
FC_D -0.010 0.193 -0.198 0.005 1  0.811 0.528 -0.043 0.265 0.326 
 0.724 0.000 0.000 0.870   0.000 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.000 
FC_Met 0.080 0.476 0.046 0.216  1 0.079 0.125 -0.059 0.024 0.221 
 0.072 0.000 0.303 0.000   0.074 0.005 0.185 0582 0.000 
ANALYST_N 0.017 0.181 -0.239 0.001 0.946 0.078 1 0.685 -0.020 0.295 0.317 
 0.574 0.000 0.000 0.983 0.000 0.077  0.000 0.497 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 0.082 0.320 -0.275 0.002 0.562 0.133 0.660 1 -0.015 0.317 0.328 





-0.059 -0.033 -0.140 1 0.030 -0.270 
 0.008 0.000 0.123 0.942 0.148 0.185 0.264 0.000  0.307 0.000 
AUD -0.037 0.011 -0.059 -0.010 0.265 0.024 0.294 0.317 0.030 1 0.104 
 0.211 0.697 0.043 0.727 0.000 0.582 0.000 0.000 0.307  0.000 
PROF/LOSS 0.182 0.732 -0.207 0.182 0.326 0.221 0.337 0.470 -0.270 0.104 1 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 
PRAIT = Firm-years reporting an abnormal item (1), zero otherwise; TAI = Total abnormal items reported in year t, 
scaled by market capitalisation; |EBAI|= Change between earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and 
earnings before abnormal items firm-yeart0 scaled by market capitalisation; EBAI_SIGN = change between 
earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart0 is positive (1) , 
otherwise (0); FC_D = Firm-years accompanied by an analyst forecast (1), otherwise (0); FC_Met = Met/beat 
analysts’ forecast (1), otherwise (0); ANALYST_N = The number of analysts following the firm in the relevant year; 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets; IND = Mining (1), Other (0); AUD = Big 6 Audit Firm (1), otherwise 





Logistic Regression Analysis of the Variables Predicted to be Associated with Abnormal Items 
        Model 1:   PRAITit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Dit + a5SIZEit + a6INDit + a7AUDit 
+ a8PROF/LOSSit + it   
        Model 2:   PRAITit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Metit + a5ANALYST_Nit + 
a6SIZEit + a7INDit + a8AUDit + a9PROF/LOSSit + it 
EBAI -2.588 -1.953 -2.314
-4.681 ** -1.736 ^ -3.514 **
|∆EBAI| -0.225 -0.625 -0.190
-0.382 -0.441 -0.291
∆EBAI_SIGN 0.252 0.333 0.231







SIZE 0.160 0.040 0.129
5.568 ** 0.634 3.260 **
IND 0.251 0.355 0.078
2.294 * 1.930 ^ 0.552
AUD -0.537 -0.094 -0.741
-4.881 ** -0.456 -5.645 **
PROF/LOSS -0.494 -0.674 -0.550
-2.920 ** -1.796 ^ -2.749 **
Constant -1.028 0.263 -0.625
-2.852 ** 0.320 -1.304
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
N 2177 910 1267
Nagelkerke R2 0.082 0.11 0.098
Wald χ2 138.696 77.734 96.939
Sig <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Model 1: Full Sample 
 Model 2: With 





^/ */ ** Significant at the 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 level (two tailed). 
PRAIT = Firm-years reporting an abnormal item (1), zero otherwise; EBAI = Earnings before abnormal items in 
year t, scaled by market capitalisation; |EBAI|= Change between earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 
and earnings before abnormal items firm-yeart0 scaled by market capitalisation; EBAI_SIGN = change between 
earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart0 is positive (1) , 
otherwise (0); FC_D = Firm-years accompanied by an analyst forecast (1), otherwise (0); FC_Met = Met/beat 
analysts’ forecast (1), otherwise (0); ANALYST_N = The number of analysts following the firm in the relevant year; 
SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets; IND = Mining (1), Other (0); AUD = Big 6 Audit Firm (1), otherwise 
(0); PROF/LOSS = Firms reporting a profit before abnormal items (1),  Firms reporting a loss before abnormal items 





Regression Analysis of the Variables Predicted to be Associated with Abnormal Items 
Model 3:  TAIit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Dit + a5SIZEit + 
a6INDit + a7AUDit + a8PROF/LOSSit + it 
 
Model 4:  TAIit = ao + a1EBAIit + a2|EBAI|it + a3EBAI_SIGNit + a4FC_Metit + a5ANALYST_Nit +  
a6SIZEit + a7INDit + a8AUDit + a9PROF/LOSSit + it 
 
EBAI .020 .031 .048 .070 .037 .066
.611 1.692 ^ 1.196 1.236 1.035 .921
|∆EBAI| -.135 .123 -.302 -.194 .061 -.235
-4.023 ** 7.169 ** -7.201 ** -2.865 ** 1.349 -2.812 **
∆EBAI_SIGN .000 .000 -.009 -.008 .012 -.014
-.013 -.001 -1.306 -1.158 3.005 ** -1.559
FC_D -.008 -.007 .006
-1.231 -1.887 ^ .727
FC_Met .000 .001 -.003
-.044 .219 -.315
ANALYSTS_N .001 -.001 .002
.688 -1.294 1.443
SIZE .002 -.002 .002 .002 .000 .000
1.159 -2.403 * .890 .740 .243 -.051
IND -.008 .000 -.018 -.013 .007 -.026
-1.303 -.095 -2.462 * -1.646 1.488 -2.619 **
AUD -.007 .009 -.001 -.003 .003 -.005
-1.043 2.807 ** -.171 -.250 .459 -.404
PROF/LOSS .035 -.016 .035 .041 .003 .029
3.695 ** -2.992 ** 3.112 ** 2.702 ** .211 1.594
Constant -.076 .054 -.109 -.100 .005 -.090
-3.648 ** 4.725 ** -4.427 ** -2.762 ** .217 -1.983 *
Year dummies included YES YES YES YES YES YES
N 1160 420 740 513 169 344
Adj R2 0.072 0.253 0.169 0.087 0.092 0.112
F-stat 7.463 11.156 11.766 4.255 2.137 3.885
Sig <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
t -stat t -statt -stat t -stat t -stat t -stat
(5) (6)
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Model 3 Model 4 (With Analyst Following)
All Firms with AIs 
Firms with AI 
Gains
Firms with AI 
Losses
All Firms with 
AIs 
Firms with AI 
Gains
Firms with AI 
Losses
 
^/ */ ** Significant at the 0.10 / 0.05 / 0.01 level (two tailed). 
TAI = Total abnormal items reported in year t, scaled by market capitalisation; EBAI = Earnings before abnormal 
items in year t, scaled by market capitalisation; |EBAI|= Change between earnings before abnormal items for firm-
yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items firm-yeart0 scaled by market capitalisation; EBAI_SIGN = change 
between earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart-1 and earnings before abnormal items for firm-yeart0 is 
positive (1) , otherwise (0);  FC_D = Firm-years accompanied by an analyst forecast (1), otherwise (0); FC_Met = 
Met/beat analysts’ forecast (1), otherwise (0); ANALYST_N = The number of analysts following the firm in the 
relevant year; SIZE = The natural logarithm of total assets; IND = Mining (1), Other (0); AUD = Big 6 Audit Firm 
(1), otherwise (0); PROF/LOSS = Firms reporting a profit before abnormal items (1),  Firms reporting a loss before 
abnormal items (0). Year dummy variables included to control for economy-wide effects. 
 
